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SCENIC RIVERS ASSOCIATION V. LYNN:
THE EFFECT OF NEPA ON THE
INTERSTATE LAND SALES ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
By enacting the National Environmental Policy Act of 19691
(NEPA), Congress sought to "provide all agencies and all Federal
officials with a legislative mandate and a responsibility to con-
sider the consequences of their actions on the environment."2 In
addition to establishing a responsible national environmental
policy for the federal government, NEPA was designed to facili-
tate the implementation of that policy by providing for the
gathering of information about the environmental effects of
federal actions.3 Under NEPA, federal agencies planning "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment ' 4 are required to prepare environmental impact
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). For an outstanding introduction to NEPA, see F.
ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT (1973).
2 COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, REPORT ON NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLIcY ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1969). See 115 CONG. REC.
40416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
' See Chapter V-Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§
1500.1-1500.14 (1974).
4 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). Section 4332 reads in part as follows:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1)
the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be inter-
preted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter,
and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-...
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact in-
volved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appro-
priate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and
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statements. The intended scope of NEPA is made plain in the
Act itself. "[T]o the fullest extent possible . . . the policies, regula-
tions and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in
[NEPA].
' 5
Passage of the Act spawned great hopes, 6 drew substantial
criticism,7 and generated a great volume of litigation.8 Not sur-
prisingly, the bulk of the NEPA litigation has arisen from at-
tempts to forestall a federal agency from taking action or carry-
ing out a project until an environmental impact statement has
been filed.
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the operation
of NEPA in areas of limited federal involvement, specifically the
administration of the Interstate Land Sales Act9 (ILSA) by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). ILSA
requires that real estate developers who plan to sell subdivisions
of more than fifty lots in interstate commerce file a "statement of
record"'10 with the Secretary of HUD. The obvious goal of the
registration statement is the complete and accurate disclosure of
information that would help a prospective real estate purchaser
make an informed decision. "The purpose of full disclosure is to
deter or prohibit the sale of land by use of the mails or other
channels of interstate commerce through misrepresentation of
material facts relating to the property."" The statement becomes
effective no later than thirty days after filing' 2 unless the Secre-
enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the
Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552
of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review
processes ....
5 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
6 Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230 (1970).
7 E.g., Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process: En-
vironmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace?, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 963 (1970); Sax,
The (Unhappy) Truth about NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973).
See F. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 298-307.
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970).
10 15 U.S.C. § 1705 (1970).
11 CONF. REP. No. 1785, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3053, 3066. Comparison of the Interstate Land Sales Act and the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970), reveals remarkable similarities. "This 'truth in se-
curities' law has two basic objectives: (a) to provide investors with material financial and
other information concerning securities offered for public sale; and (b) to prohibit mis-
representation, deceit and other fraudulent acts and practices in the sale of securities
generally ...... W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS A-79 (4th ed. 1969).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1706(a) (1970).
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tary finds it to be "incomplete or inaccurate in any material
respect,"'13 and any material misstatement or omission subjects a
developer to both civil and criminal liability.
14
In the recent case of Scenic Rivers Association v. Lynn,' 5 the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed an order re-
quiring HUD to submit an environmental impact statement be-
fore permitting a real estate developer to complete sales under
ILSA. The case stemmed from a proposed development by the
Flint Ridge Development Company of seven thousand acres of
land along the Illinois River, a "scenic river" by state desig-
nation.' 6 Sewage from the proposed three thousand lots and
homes, the district court found, would eventually make its way
into the Illinois River because of the porous nature of the area's
soil.' 7 It was not difficult for the court to conclude that the
development would significantly affect the quality of the envi-
ronment.
The most salient aspect of the district court's decision was
the holding that HUD's authority to suspend a disclosure state-
ment for inaccuracies could constitute major federal action. The
district court was of the view that any time a federal agency's
action would advance a project that would have a significant
environmental impact, the agency's action would be subject to
application of NEPA. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit voiced sub-
stantial agreement with this interpretation:
[T]he consequences of the government's approval of
the statement in terms of ease of obtaining funds and in
terms of the ultimate direct consequences on the envi-
ronment of the building of the houses lead to the con-
clusion that the district court was correct in holding that
major federal action significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment was present.' 8
The court, however, failed to address itself to the problem of the
limited nature of HUD's authority under ILSA.
The primary statutory issue raised by the interaction of
NEPA and ILSA is whether HUD's role in protecting purchasers
13 15 U.S.C. § 1706(b) (1970).
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 1709, 1717 (1970).
'1 382 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Okla. 1974), aff'd, Civil Nos. 74-1520 & 74-1750 (10th Cir.,
July 30, 1975).
16 382 F. Supp. at 73.
17Id.
18 Civil Nos. 74-1520 & 74-1750 at 8.
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of real estate amounts to the major federal action that is a pre-
requisite to application of NEPA. This issue must be viewed in
light of NEPA's broad mandate that the laws of the United States
be interpreted and administered, "to the fullest extent possible,"
in accord with NEPA. The Scenic Rivers decision, in holding that
HUD's activities under ILSA require compliance with NEPA,
raises important questions about NEPA's impact on essentially
private projects which only involve the activities of a federal
agency tangentially.
II. WHEN AN IMPACT STATEMENT IS REQUIRED
A. Major Federal Action
Many difficulties are encountered in defining what Con-
gress meant by the phrase "major Federal actions" 19 in NEPA.
Among the logical interpretations of the phrase are the follow-
ing possibilities: The federal action must simply be financially
large in scope, as when a project significantly affecting the envi-
ronment stems from "major" federal funding;20 the federal ac-
19 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
20 The federal government gives financial and planning support to state and local
governments and to private organizations; in return for this assistance, it frequently
demands some control over the project. But see note 49 infra & accompanying text.
Federal participation in state highway construction is the most fertile source of litigation
within this category. See, e.g., Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conserva-
tion Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974); Citizens for Balanced
Environment & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe, 376 F. Supp. 806 (D. Conn.), aff'd per curiam, 503
F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1974); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Lathan v. Volpe,
455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971).
Especially difficult are the cases in which a highway segment built solely with state
funds would be of no use unless joined to a larger segment built with federal assistance.
See Citizens for Balanced Environment & Trans., Inc. v. Volpe, 376 F. Supp. 806, 813-14
(D. Conn.), affd per curiam, 503 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1974). Impact statements have been
required even absent federal funding when the project was deemed to have a federal
character because of close federal contacts. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp.
1002 (N.D. Cal. 1972); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971), affd,
488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied before judgment of the Ninth Circuit, 409 U.S. 890
(1972) (federal action despite absence of application for federal funds). But see Ely v.
Velde, 363 F. Supp. 277, 286 (E.D. Va. 1973) (project loses federal character when state
waives use of federal funds).
A primary concern in this area seems to be that federal funds are being shifted to
avoid preparation of an impact statement for segments that have unique and severe
environmental consequences. Although the use of federal funds in a state project will
generally result in a finding of federal action, Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484
F.2d 11, 16 (8th Cir. 1973) (dictum), it has been held that the use of some federal
planning funds in a large project does not result in "federal action" because the federal
involvement is too small. James River & Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Met-
ropolitan Authority, 359 F. Supp. 611, 636 n.72 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 481 F.2d
1280 (4th Cir. 1973).
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tion must involve the discretionary authority of a federal agency
to approve or disapprove an environmentally significant project
on environmental grounds; 21 the federal action itself must sub-
stantially cause the significant environmental impact regardless
of dollar output, as when the federal action directly produces the
depletion of an important resource;2 2 the federal action must
involve the authority of a federal agency to approve or disap-
prove an environmentally significant project (even on non-
environmental grounds), as when inaccuracies appear in an
ILSA disclosure statement.23 Each of these possible interpreta-
tions will be examined in turn.
It is tempting to view the degree of a federal agency's in-
volvement in a project in terms of its financial expenditure. In
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant,24 for instance, the
district court determined that major federal action existed
because of "substantial planning, time, resources or expen-
diture. '25 That case involved a conservation and flood preven-
tion project requiring sixty-six miles of "channel enlarge-
ment. '26 The project was to be financed by the state and federal
governments at a cost of about $1.5 million, the federal share
being $706,000. While deciding that there was "certainly"2 7
major federal action, the court failed to indicate the precise level
at which the certainty arose.
Apart from the obvious difficulty of trying to define the
Federal interaction with private parties often involves housing and redevelopment
projects. E.g., Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); San
Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1973). In Goose Hollow Foot-
hills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971), HUD made a commitment to
lend more than three million dollars to the developer of a sixteen-story apartment build-
ing without preparing an impact statement. Further disbursement of federal money was
enjoined until HUD filed an impact statement. And in Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st
Cir. 1973), a private developer of a housing project secured a mortgage guarantee and
an interest grant from HUD. In an initial suit, HUD was ordered to supply an impact
statement. While HUD was complying with this mandate, the developer proceeded with
preliminary construction activities, such as tree cutting. In deciding that it could enjoin
the private developer, the court said, citing Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357
U.S. 275 (1958), that "one in partnership with the federal government can be prohibited
from acting in a certain manner." 473 F.2d at 290.
21 See text accompanying notes 28-32 infra.
22 See text accompanying notes 33-42 infra.
2 ' See text accompanying notes 43-49 infra.
24 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (impact statement ordered), 355 F. Supp. 280
(E.D.N.C. 1973) (injunction issued pending full hearing on sufficiency of final state-
ment); see also Citizens Organized to Defend Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp.
520, 540 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
25 341 F. Supp. at 366-67.
26 Id. at 362.
217Id. at 367.
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minimum level of funding at which major federal action occurs,
this quantitative approach cannot in itself satisfy the NEPA goal
of creating federal responsiveness to qualitative environmental
concerns. Some actions by federal agencies may require little
planning, time, or resource expenditure, but still be crucial to an
environmentally significant project. In Davis v. Morton,28 for in-
stance, the Department of the Interior had the authority to
evaluate the environmental impact of a ninety-nine-year lease of
a substantial amount of restricted Indian land by the Pueblo
Indians to a development company. The Department of the In-
terior could disapprove the leasing project on environmental
grounds; 29 yet in quantitative terms, the Department had no
interest, stemming from financing or investment, in the leasing
endeavor.
The decision in Davis v. Morton recognizes that NEPA re-
quires federal agencies to act responsibly in the protection of the
environment, because "where a federal license or permit is in-
volved, or where Congress possesses and has utilized its plenary
power of regulation .. .federal approval constitutes major fed-
eral action. ' 30 Thus, when a federal agency with "plenary" pow-
ers of regulation has the authority to avoid or reduce potentially
significant environmental harm, NEPA should be viewed as plac-
ing a legal obligation upon that agency to prepare an impact
statement and to consider the accumulated information in exer-
cising its authority.
Perhaps the best illustration of the discretionary approval
situation is the Atomic Energy Commission's control over the
construction and operation of nuclear power plants.3 1 Although
28 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
29 Id. at 597. The authority of the Department to disapprove a proposed leasing of
restricted Indian Lands stems from 25 U.S.C. § 415, as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 415 (Supp.
III, 1973).
30 469 F.2d at 597. Cf. National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408,
411-12 (9th Cir. 1973): "The land exchange is thus analogous to the licensing of or
granting of federal funds to a nonfederal entity to enable it to act. Such federal 'enable-
ment' has consistently been held to be subject to NEPA." But see Rucker v. Willis, 484
F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973), in which the Army Corps of Engineers was not required to
prepare an impact statement before issuing a permit to construct a large commercial
pier. Even the dissenting judge thought it obvious that the issuance of a permit by the
Corps to a private homeowner would not constitute "major federal action requiring the
preparation of an impact statement." Id. at 164 (Craven, J., dissenting). Thus the court
was in agreement that some federal permits allowing environmentally adverse private
action may be issued without an accompanying impact statement. See also note 63 infra.
"See Izaak Walton League v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971). The
Atomic Energy Commission was abolished by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-91 (Supp., Feb. 1975), and its powers and responsibilities were divided
1975]
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the plants are built by private companies, extensive federal regu-
lation has been deemed essential because of planning and safety
concerns. Without federal permits the plants can neither be con-
structed nor operated. Because safety regulation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal agency and because it is not
realistic to separate safety from environmental issues, the control
of the federal agency over development of nuclear energy
facilities mandates that it be held environmentally accountable.
Even though the development of a nuclear power plant is tech-
nically a private endeavor, regulation of such development
places an agency in as proper a position to consider environmen-
tal effects as if it actually built the plant. Such an agency may not
avoid its environmental responsibilities under NEPA by showing
that it did not originally "cause" the power plant to be built.
NEPA's directives to federal agencies to consider environmental
consequences are broad and must be followed "to the fullest
extent possible."
Once it is determined that a project will have significant
environmental effects, the question should be not whether the
federal financial expenditure is too small, but rather whether the
involvement is too slight to justify attributing to the federal
agency responsibility for the environmental effects of its action.
When the federal government decides whether to fund a project
that is environmentally significant under NEPA, it is certainly in
a position to exert influence upon the project to the extent that
withholding federal funds permits. Focusing on federal respon-
sibility makes it apparent that an impact statement should be
required unless the funding is so slight that a denial of funds
would not affect the project.
32
Both Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz33 and
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz3 4 provide addi-
tional support for focusing in this way on federal responsibility.
In Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council, the Forest Service was
ordered to prepare an impact statement before it sold timber
from a national forest. Although the court hardly discussed the
between the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission.32
See Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (M.D.N.C. 1975), affd,
Civil No. 75-1253 (4th Cir., June 25, 1975); cf. Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 891 (1st Cir.
1973); Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir.
1972).
33 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
34 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
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"major federal action" language, there is little doubt that it was
strongly influenced by the Forest Service's role as vendor. Such a
role is more directly related to the environmental concern at
stake than the role of the Department of the Interior in Davis.3 5
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council did not involve mere dis-
cretionary approval, but'presented a situation in which the fed-
eral government affirmatively undertook to engage in an en-
vironmentally significant project. The decision to appropriate
timber removal areas might not have involved a large federal
expenditure, but it placed the federal government in a key posi-
tion to assess and avoid whatever environmental harm might
result. It appears that this key federal position was indeed the
basis underlying the court's finding of a major federal action. 36
Similariy, in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, -3 7
the court was unable to base its decision on the amount of the
federal expenditure: The "actions of the Forest Service cannot
be quantified in terms of dollars to be spent or tons of earth to
be moved. s3 8 The court nonetheless determined that the Forest
Service was "significantly involved"3 9 in the timber sales at issue.
After the effective date of NEPA the Forest Service negotiated
modifications and extensions of the timber sales contracts. De-
spite this involvement, the court felt obliged to observe that the
Forest Service had also made a monetary expenditure when the
timber sales failed to generate enough revenue to pay for the
subsequent reforestation program. 40 The financial involvement,
however, did not in any way expand the Forest Service's oppor-
tunity to respond to the environmental concerns raised by the
timber sale and therefore should have been unnecessary to a
finding of major federal action.
The Forest Service's activities in Wyoming Outdoor Coordinat-
ing Council and Minnesota Public Interest Research Group were in-
strumental in the execution of the timber sales. In National
Helium Corp. v. Morton,41 an even simpler question of federal
responsibility was posed. There the Secretary of the Interior
terminated contracts with suppliers of helium without preparing
an impact statement. A direct consequence of the termination
35 Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
36 484 F.2d at 1247.
37 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
38Id. at 1319.
39 Id. at 1322.
40 1d. at 1322-23.
41 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
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would have been the loss of helium into the atmosphere, ac-
celerating depletion of the country's helium reserves. 42 The
court enjoined termination of the contract, concluding that when
federal action is the direct cause of environmental effects, such
action is major. This result flowed from an assessment of the
degree of federal responsibility for the consequences and not
from measurement of the quantitative indicia of federal in-
volvement.
Ostensibly, Scenic Rivers presents a situation of minimal fed-
eral involvement and raises the question whether any federal
regulatory involvement constitutes major federal action within
the meaning of NEPA, rendering primarily private activity sus-
ceptible to NEPA's impact statement provision. Although ILSA
requires information in the disclosure statement on the availabil-
ity of sewage facilities for the proposed development,43 the
primary thrust of the statement is non-environmental. ILSA
does not authorize HUD to suspend a development project for
any reason other than inaccuracy of the disclosure statement.
Even a statement indicating lack of sewage facilities, if accurate,
must therefore be approved.
Viewing ILSA on its face, one cannot compare HUD's au-
thority to require accuracy in a disclosure statement with the
Department of the Interior's discretionary authority to disap-
prove a leasing project by the Pueblo Indians, 44 or with the
Forest Service's affirmative involvement in timber sales,45 or with
Interior's termination of helium supply contracts. 46 The only
benefit of requiring an impact statement in the Scenic Rivers con-
text would be to provide general information for legislative, ex-
ecutive, or public use; the impact statement could not serve as a
guide for decisionmaking. Although the informational benefit
may be consistent with NEPA's aims, the major federal action
requirement demands an initial analysis of HUD's involvement
in and responsibility for the environmentally significant de-
velopment before an impact statement can be required.
4 2 Id. at 656.
43 15 U.S.C. § 1705(5) (1970).
44 Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972); see text accompanying notes 28-30
supra.
45 Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973);
see text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
46 National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); see text accom-
panying notes 41 & 42 supra.
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If HUD lacks authority to affect the environmental conse-
quences of a development, it cannot be considered responsible
for that development's adverse environmental impact. Because
HUD's disapproval of the ILSA statement would hinder or pre-
vent the development project, it might be viewed as a remote
link in a chain of causation; 47 but if HUD cannot disapprove an
accurate statement even this causation theory fails. To hold, as
Scenic Rivers seems to have done, that any such federal contact is
automatically major federal action 48 is to expand the scope of
NEPA far beyond what was contemplated even in the Davis (dis-
cretionary authority) case. Both the district and appellate deci-
sions in Scenic Rivers ignore the lack of federal power over the
environmental consequences of the proposed development and
in effect construe the word "major" out of NEPA. 49 Scenic Rivers
should not have required an impact statement.
The only theoretical justification for the Scenic Rivers deci-
sion is that NEPA's phrase "to the fullest extent possible" ex-
pands HUD's authority under ILSA to provide for discretionary
environmental approval. This issue will be examined below.
50
B. HUD's Responsibility for Environmental Consequences
1. The Two-Pronged Test
It has been suggested that the "significantly affecting" lan-
guage and the word "major" in "major Federal actions" repre-
sent a single standard. In Minnesota Public Interest Research Group
v. Butz 5 involving timber sales by the Forest Service, the court
expressed concern that "[b]y bifurcating the statutory language,
it would be possible to speak of a 'minor federal action signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment,' and to
47 See Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 14 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
48 Civil Nos. 74-1520 & 74-1750 at 9.
49 Cf. Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (M.D.N.C. 1975), affd,
Civil No. 75-1253 (4th Cir., June 25, 1975), in which the federal involvement consisted of
the provision of funds to a locality under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of
1972 (Revenue Sharing Act), 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1263 (Supp III, 1973). The district court
stated that "[t]he planned use report does not relate to the amount of money to be
received and, more importantly, does not entail federal approval of any specific project
or confine the discretion of local governments as to the purposes for which the funds
should be spent." Civil No. 75-1253 at 12 (footnote omitted). The court held that there
was thus no federal action for the purposes of NEPA. But since there was obviously
federal action in the lending of funds, the court's real focus must have been on the
absence of major federal action.
50 See text accompanying notes 57-88 infra.
5' 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); see text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
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hold NEPA inapplicable to such an action. '52 The court felt that
such a result would frustrate the intent of NEPA, and that if
federal action significantly affected the environment it must
have been "major" federal action. This correlation would hold
true, if ever, only when the federal action directly and exclu-
sively "caused" the environmental consequences. Otherwise, the
court's analysis leaves "major" out of the Act and only looks to
the magnitude of the environmental consequences. The court
probably thought of "major" and "minor" simply in quantitative
terms. If the requirement of major federal action is viewed as a
standard of federal responsibility, the court's concern probably
would be satisfied.
Other courts have viewed the two phrases as distinct factors
for consideration. In Hanly v. Mitchell,53 for example, the Second
Circuit articulated the two-pronged approach:
Plaintiffs argue that if a federal action is "major," ... it
must have a "significant" effect on the environment and
call for an impact statement. Defendants claim that the
term "major Federal action" refers to the cost of
the project, the amount of planning that preceded
it, and the time required to complete it, but does not
refer to the impact of the project on the environment.
We agree with defendants that the two concepts are dif-
ferent .... 54
The two-step analysis conforms more closely to the statutory
language; furthermore, the NEPA guidelines promulgated by
the Council on Environmental Quality clearly prescribe a multi-
step approach.
55
52 1d. at 1321-22.
3 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
,4 Id. at 644. In Hanly, the plaintiffs tried to argue the converse of the court's
position in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group. Instead of saying that a significant
effect on the environment implied major federal action, they urged the court to rule that
a major federal project involving a large expenditure of funds automatically would have
a significant effect on the environment. Id. Although the situations are thus different,
and though the latter proposition is logically more difficult to maintain than the former,
the Second Circuit's rejection of the unitary standard may also apply to the former
situation.
5 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(c) (1974): "[T]he action must be a (1) 'major' action, (2) which is
a 'Federal action,' (3) which has a 'significant' effect, and (4) which involves the 'quality of
the human environment.' The words 'major' and 'significantly' are intended to imply
thresholds of importance and impact that must be met before a statement is required."
"These CEQ guidelines are merely advisory, because the CEQ does not have the
authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with NEPA." Hiram Clarke
Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Part of the difficulty with the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Scenic Rivers is that it implicitly adopts a unitary approach and
fails to separate the quantitative environmental effects from the
nature of federal involvement in the Flint Ridge development.
This approach led to the conclusion that any federal action, even
review of the accuracy of a real estate disclosure statement, is
major federal action. What is implicit in the Tenth Circuit's opin-
ion was explicit in the district court opinion. The latter court
found that the Flint Ridge Development Company's projected
gross income "reflect[ed] the magnitude of the development and
show[ed] that HUD's action in approving the Property Report
and Statement of Record under the Interstate Land Sales Act
constituted major federal action. '56 The district and appellate
courts were reluctant, in light of the finding that the project
would have significant environmental effects, to accept that
HUD was not responsible in any way for the Flint Ridge Project.
If it had taken the bifurcated approach, the court would have
been unable to buttress its holding with quantitative financial or
environmental data and would properly have been forced to face
directly the question of federal responsibility.
2. The Impact of NEPA on Agency Jurisdiction
If HUD's power under ILSA were expanded by the opera-
tion of NEPA to include discretionary authority to disapprove a
development project for environmental reasons, the responsibil-
ity analysis discussed above might lead to a finding of major
federal action. There is nothing in the Tenth Circuit's opinion in
Scenic Rivers to suggest such an expansion. Analogous questions,
however, have been raised under other federal statutes.
Section 102 of NEPA directs that federal regulations and
laws be "interpreted and administered in accordance with the
policies" of the Act "to the fullest extent possible." Judge Skelly
Wright, in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 57 wrote
that the section 102 duties "must be complied with to the fullest
extent, unless there is a clear conflict of statutory authority. Con-
siderations of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost
will not suffice to strip the section of its fundamental im-
portance."58 The guidelines of the Council on Environmental
Quality support Judge Wright's view; "[t]he phrase 'to the fullest
56 382 F. Supp. at 72.
57 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
5 8Id. at 1115 (footnote omitted).
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extent possible' in section 102 is meant to make clear that each
agency of the Federal Government shall comply with that section
unless existing law applicable to the agency's operations ex-
pressly prohibits or makes compliance impossible.
59
The Army Corps of Engineers' compliance with the spirit of
these exhortations was challenged in Zabel v. Tabb.60 The Corps
refused to issue a permit to a mobile home park developer who
wanted to dredge and fill valuable tidelands. Although the Corps
did not invoke the statutory basis for denial of a permit (obstruc-
tion of navigation), the Fifth Circuit upheld the Corps' decision
by relying in part on the policies underlying NEPA, although
NEPA itself had not been enacted when the Corps' action was
taken.6 1 The court held that the Corps was "entitled, if not re-
quired, to consider ecological factors" in evaluating permit
applications.6 2 The Corps had traditionally been allowed to exer-
cise some discretion in its assessment of projects, and environ-
mental concerns seemed relevant to the Corps' decisionmaking
processes. Environmental considerations could be incorporated
consistently with the Corps' existing authority. Though the
Corps employed NEPA to justify its own decision, the result
might be the same when concerned citizens seek an impact
statement, once the Corps' discretionary authority is deemed to
include environmental factors. When significant environmental
effects may be foreseen, the Corps' ability to respond effectively
to such factors in making a permit decision should render its
decision major federal action.
63
Some courts, however, take a narrower view of the authority
granted by NEPA. In Kitchen v. FCC,64 for example, residents of
a community in which the telephone company proposed to con-
59 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4(a) (1974).
60 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
61 430 F.2d at 213.
62 Id. at 201.
'3 An argument can be made that this type of decision by a federal agency should
never be subject to NEPA's impact statement requirement. The language of the statute
refers to inclusion of an impact statement in every "recommendation" or "report" on
"proposals for legislation" or "other major Federal actions." Because processing of permit
or license applications or approval of private projects (as by HUD under ILSA) may not
involve the preparation of a report on proposed federal action, because the action pro-
posed is private, § 102(2)(C) may be wholly inapplicable to this kind of administrative
action. Cf. Anderson, supra note 1, at 125-26.
64 464 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Cf. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Hack-
ensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm., 464 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1118 (1973).
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struct an exchange building argued that NEPA required the
Federal Communications Commission to consider the environ-
mental effects of the construction. The Communications Act de-
nied the FCC jurisdiction over the telephone exchange building,
which was regulated by the state; 65 the Commission could not
approve or disapprove construction on any grounds. The court
agreed with the FCC and the telephone company that NEPA
may supplement existing agency authority but cannot confer
new jurisdiction on the agency. 6
In Gage v. AEC,67 farmers whose land was about to be ac-
quired for a nuclear power plant site, by the exercise of eminent
domain, sought to require the Atomic Energy Commission to
prepare an impact statement before any land was taken. The
court noted, besides the practical difficulty of having the AEC
prepare a statement before being approached for a permit, that
"NEPA does not mandate action which goes beyond the agency's
organic jurisdiction.
68
A seemingly contrary case, National Resources Defense Council
v. Morton69 (NRDC), is distinguishable. There the Department of
the Interior was ordered to look beyond the scope of its im-
mediate authority in making a decision about the leasing of
offshore oil and gas tracts. The Department sought to avoid
consideration of the elimination of oil import quotas as an alter-
native to leasing the tracts, because it believed that such an in-
quiry was beyond the scope of its expertise and decisionmaking
authority.70 Of course, one of the most important elements of an
impact statement is the discussion of "alternatives to the pro-
posed action."7' The court required the consideration of oil im-
port quotas, but did so on quite narrow grounds: "While the
Department of the Interior does not have the authority to elimi-
nate or reduce oil import quotas, such action is within the pur-
view of both Congress and the President, to whom the impact
statement goes.17 2 The court recognized the benefit to be de-
rived from consolidating pertinent information into one state-
ment that would inform executive and legislative decisionmak-
63 Communications Act § 221(b), 47 U.S.C. § 221(b) (1970); see 464 F.2d at 802-03.
66 464 F.2d at 802.
67 479 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
68 Id. at 1220 n.19.
69 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
7 0 Id. at 834.
71 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (iii) (1970).
72 458 F.2d at 835.
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ers. NRDC is unique in that it involved the development of a
comprehensive plan to deal with the impending energy crisis,
thus broadening the Department's duties to evaluate alterna-
tives. 73 Most important, the Department did not dispute its ob-
ligation to file an impact statement, but only defended as ade-
quate the statement it had already filed,7 4 which did not contain
a discussion of the environmental impact of alternatives. The
content of the statement, not its necessity, was at issue.
The Interstate Land Sales Act is legislation of specific pur-
pose and restricted scope.75 Congressional concern was limited
to protection of the real estate buyer. HUD has discretion only in
determining whether disclosure has been adequate. "Ordinarily,
when an agency is granted discretionary authority, that discre-
tion is to be exercised within certain limits and for the accom-
plishment of certain statutory purposes. ' 76 NEPA's general pol-
icies of disclosure and agency concern for the environment
should not be interpreted to expand HUD's powers to enable it,
in effect, to prevent real estate sales because of potential en-
vironmental problems.
For HUD to consider environmental effects when deciding
whether to approve ILSA disclosure statements would conflict
with its statutory authority. Because HUD has no power to pre-
vent sales on environmental grounds, requiring the preparation
of an impact statement would be a serious waste and misalloca-
tion of agency resources. Impact statements are designed, in
part, to influence agency decisions; when the decisionmaker
cannot take the environment into account, NEPA is not frus-
trated by the lack of an impact statement.
77
Although it cannot prevent sales because it disapproves of
the environmental consequences, and should not be required to
73 
Id.
71 See id. at 829.
75 See notes 9-14 supra & accompanying text.
76 Crampton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy,
71 MICH. L. REV. 511, 520 (1973).
77 Even the size of the ILSA application fee supports this interpretation. Careful
preparation of a complete and detailed impact statement is an expensive undertaking,
but the maximum fee that can be charged is a thousand dollars. 15 U.S.C. § 1704(b)
(1970). The purpose of the fee is to "cover all or part of the cost" incurred by HUD. Id.
Congress intended the program to be essentially self-supporting; to require preparation
of impact statements would defeat the clear congressional purpose. Furthermore, HUD
could not rely solely on information supplied by the developer and would have to under-
take a detailed study of its own. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); accord, Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary, 508 F.2d
927 (2d Cir. 1974).
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prepare an impact statement, HUD does have a significant re-
sponsibility under NEPA. The environmental disclosure policies
of NEPA are designed not only to benefit officials in govern-
ment, but also to assist the public in its decisionmaking.7 8 The
reasonable real estate investor can be expected to want to know
about the environmental consequences of the development in
which he may invest. Perhaps the natural beauty of the area has
led him to invest his money; adverse environmental conse-
quences from the development could frustrate his purposes.
The analogy to the Securities and Exchange Commission ,
79
which administers the Securities Act of 1933,80 is instructive.
One of the purposes of that act is disclosure of information
about a corporation needed-by the investor. The SEC has de-
veloped regulations that require disclosure of certain environ-
mental matters.81 In Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC,82
plaintiffs sought to have the SEC broaden the disclosure reg-
ulation to cover the effect of corporate activities on the envi-
ronment. In remanding to the SEC for further rulemaking pro-
ceedings, the court mentioned the SEC's "broad rulemaking
authority," which enables it to require "information which a
reasonable investor might have considered important in making
an investment decision." 83 The congressional mandate to the
federal agencies contained in NEPA is "superimposed" upon the
SEC's rulemaking authority: "NEPA gives specific content to the
SEC's authority under the securities laws to require disclosure of
information 'in the public interest.' "84
To fulfill its duty to effectuate the policies of NEPA "to the
fullest extent possible," HUD should demand extensive disclo-
sure of the environmental consequences of a proposed develop-
ment. Because of his personal relationship to the land pur-
chased, the buyer of real estate will be even more concerned
than the investor in corporate securities about the environmental
aspects of the investment. The Interstate Land Sales Act directly
78 Cf. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
7' See note 11 supra.
80 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
81 The SEC regulations require disclosure of the corporation's environmental litiga-
tion and the effect on the corporation's financial condition of its compliance with en-
vironmental laws and regulations. SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5386 (Apr. 20,
1973).
82 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974).
8 3 Id. at 695.
84 389 F. Supp. at 695.
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mandates disclosure of some environmental information. 5 The
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development is empowered to
promulgate regulations to carry out his mission of enforcing the
Act.8 6 With the NEPA mandate added to this authority, there
should be no doubt about his power to expand the scope of
disclosure required in the statement of record. Because HUD
can investigate the accuracy of the information provided 87 and
seek severe penalties for untrue statements or omissions of mat-
erial facts, 88 the information most likely will be accurate. By
adopting this approach, HUD would remain within its jurisdic-
tional limits and would accomplish a fundamental goal of NEPA,
disclosure of environmental information.
III. CONCLUSION
In order to determine what is major federal action under
NEPA, it is recommended that courts focus their inquiry on the
federal responsibility for actions that portend a significant en-
vironmental impact. Federal responsibility cannot be found
when the federal agency lacks the authority to disapprove or
modify a proposed project on environmental grounds. In Scenic
Rivers HUD was bound by ILSA to approve an accurate and
complete disclosure statement and possessed no discretionary
authority to alter or impede the development because of poten-
tial pollution hazards. NEPA's mandate that "to the fullest extent
possible" federal regulations and laws "be interpreted and ad-
ministered in accordance with the policies set forth in [NEPA]"
does not provide a basis for expansion of the agency's statutory
authority. HUD was not responsible for the development's po-
tential environmental effects, and thus major federal action
should not have been found.
As the court directed in Hanly v. Mitchell,8 9 the inquiry into
whether a proposed project involves significant environmental
effects must be kept separate from the question of the degree of
federal action. A project may threaten significant environmental
impact but not involve the federal government enough to trigger
85 15 U.S.C. § 1705(5) (1970).
86 15 U.S.C. § 1718 (1970). The current regulations for the Office of Interstate Land
Sales Regulation are set forth at 24 C.F.R. §§ 1700.1-1720.530 (1975).
87 15 U.S.C. § 1714(b) (1970).
88 15 U.S.C. § 1717 (1970).
8- 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); see text accompanying
notes 53-55 supra.
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the impact statement requirement. The district and appellate
courts in Scenic Rivers seem to have based their finding of major
federal action in part on the magnitude of the overall project
and its potentially adverse environmental impact. The courts ig-
nored HUD's inability to avert that impact.
Environmental impact disclosure regulations that place the
burden of predicting a development's environmental conse-
quences on the developer should, however, be adopted by HUD
in administering ILSA. A land development's effect on the envi-
ronment may be a significant consideration in a decision to
purchase. But even with such regulations, HUD's actions under
ILSA should not require the preparation of an environmental
impact statement.
